

Message Text

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S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 5 BELGRADE 1776

EO 11652: GDS
TAGS: PFOR YO US
SUBJ: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT FOR YUGOSLAVIA-
PART I

REF: CERP 0001

1. THE UNITED STATES HAS TWO CONTINUING, FUNDAMENTAL
INTERESTS IN YUGOSLAVIA. FIRST WE HAVE AN IMPORTANT STAKE
IN PRESERVATION OF AT LEAST THE PRESENT DEGREE OF YUGOSLAV
INDEPENDENCE FROM THE SOVIET UNION. SECOND, WE HAVE AN
INTEREST IN MODERATING TO EXTENT POSSIBLE THOSE ASPECTS

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OF YUGOSLAVIA'S BEHAVIOR IN THE THIRD WORLD, IN EUROPE AND
IN YUGOSLAVIA ITSELF WHICH CONFLICT WITH AMERICAN POLICIES
AND VALUES.

2. LOOKING FORWARD OVER THE NEXT TWO YEARS A NUMBER OF
DEVELOPMENT ARE LIKELY TO SIGNIFICANTLY HEIGHTEN THE IMPOR-
TANCE OF THESE TWO INTERESTS AND THUS THE PRIORITY WHICH

SHOULD BE DEVOTED TO U.S.-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS.

--FIRST, AS THE S/P GLOBAL FORECAST STRESSES, THIS COULD BE "THE MOST CRITICAL PERIOD IN RECENT YUGOSLAV HISTORY--THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NEW INTERNAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND PATTERN OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS FOLLOWING THE PASSING OF TITO." TITO WILL BE 85 IN MAY AND YUGOSLAVS PERCEIVE THE PREPARATIONS NOW UNDERWAY FOR 1978'S 11TH PARTY CONGRESS AS ESTABLISHING THE PEOPLE AND POLICIES WHICH WILL BE PRESENT WHEN HE LEAVES THE SCENE. NATIONALITY, IDEO-LOGICAL AND OTHER TENSIONS REMAIN NOT FAR BENEATH THE SURFACE, LEAVING OPEN MANY POSSIBLE PATHS FOR POST-TITO YUGOSLAVIA: FROM SUBSTANTIAL CONTINUITY AND STABILITY TO UNREST AND CIVIL STRIFE, FROM GREATER LIBERALISM TO MORE REPRESSION, FROM "NON-ALIGNMENT" TO A DRIFT EITHER WEST OR EAST.

--SECOND, YUGOSLAVIA WILL DURING THE NEXT TWO YEARS PLAY A KEY ROLE IN MULTILATERAL EVENTS OF MAJOR IMPORTANCE TO U.S. FOREIGN POLICY. IN CSCE AND HUMAN RIGHTS, BELGRADE IS THE HOST FOR THE 1977 FOLLOW-UP CONFERENCE AND THE GOY IS ALREADY AT CENTER STAGE ATTEMPTING TO INFLUENCE NOT JUST ADMINISTRATIVE BUT POLICY DECISIONS. IN DISARMAMENT, YUGOSLAVIA IS THE CHIEF SPONSOR AND ORGANIZER OF THE 1978 UN SPECIAL ON DISARMAMENT AND THUS POTENTIALLY OUR MOST INFLUENTIAL THIRD WORLD INTERLOCUTOR FOR THE ENTIRE RANGE OF ISSUES FROM NON-PROLIFERATION TO CONVENTIONA DISARMAMENT. IN NORTH-SOUTH RELATIONS, THEY ARE ONE OF FOUR OR FIVE MOST ACTIVE AND EFFECTIVE NATIONS AS THE NON-ALIGNED AND OTHER DEVELOPING COUNTRIES ADDRESS A BROAD RANGE

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OF CURRENT ISSUES RANGING FROM SOUTH AFRICA TO THE NEW INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER AND IT NOW APPEARS BELGRADE WILL HOST NEXT YEAR'S NON-ALIGNED FOREIGN MINISTERS' MEETING.

3. OUR CAPACITY TO INFLUENCE YUGOSLAVIA'S INTERNAL DEVELOPMENT AND FOREIGN POLICY AS IT ENTERS THE TITO TRANSITION ERA IS LIMITED BUT MEANINGFUL. WHILE WE ARE NOT LIKELY TO BECOME AS SIGNIFICANT A FACTOR IN THIS COUNTRY'S CALCULATIONS AS THE SOVIET UNION AND SHOULD HAVE NO ILLUSIONS ABOUT OFFICIAL, COMMUNIST YUGOSLAVIA'S "FRIENDSHIP" FOR THE UNITED STATES, WE HAVE PLAYED A DECISIVE ROLE AT CERTAIN TURNING POINTS IN THEIR HISTORY AND MAY BE IN A POSITION TO DO SO AGAIN. LOOKING AT THE ENORMOUS SWINGS IN U.S.-YUGOSLAV AND SOVIET-YUGOSLAV RELATIONS OVER THE PAST THREE DECADES, ONE LESSON SEEMS FAIRLY CLEAR -- THE MORE WE HAVE ENGAGED THEM, THE MORE INFLUENCE WE HAVE HAD. THUS WE BELIEVE THE CENTRAL THEME OF OUR NEW POLICY SHOULD BE A SUBSTANTIAL INCREASED AMERICAN EFFORT TO ENGAGE YUGOSLAVIA ACROSS A WIDE SPECTRUM OF BILATERAL AND MULTILATERAL ACTIVITIES,

AND IN RETURN TO CONVEY TO THE YUGOSLAVS OUR EXPECTATION THAT THEY WILL BECOME MORE WILLING TO LOOK BEYOND IDEOLOGICAL HOSTILITY TO PRACTICAL AND COOPERATIVE SOLUTIONS TO THE SERIOUS PROBLEMS FACING THE WORLD. TO GIVE CONCRETE MEANING TO THIS POLICY, WE RECOMMEND THE FOLLOWING POLICY STEPS:

4. -- OPENING A HIGH-LEVEL DIALOGUE WITH TITO'S POTENTIAL SUCCESSORS. CLEARLY WE NEED TO GET TO KNOW THE NEXT GENERATION OF LEADERS, MEN WHO ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO RUN THIS COUNTRY. IDEALLY WE SHOULD STRIVE FOR THE KIND OF INTIMATE AND SUSTAINED ONE-ON-ONE RELATIONSHIP THAT SUCH WESTERN EUROPEAN SOCIAL DEMOCRATS AS WILLY BRANDT HAVE CREATED WITH MEN LIKE STANE DOLANC, THE MOST POWERFUL FIGURE AFTER TITO AND KARDELJ. FROM THE U.S. SIDE VICE PRESIDENT MONDALE STRIKES US AS AN IDEAL CANDIDATE TO DEVELOP AND CARRY ON SUCH A DIALOGUE OVER A PERIOD OF YEARS. THE KARDELJ
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VISIT WILL BE THE BEGINNING. BUT WE SHOULD LOOK BEYOND IT AS WELL. CONGRESS SHOULD BE PRESSED TO ISSUE THE INVITATION THE YUGOSLAVS ARE EXPECTING FOR A RETURN VISIT THIS YEAR BY ASSEMBLY PRESIDENT GLIGOROV, PERHAPS THE BRIGHTEST POLITICIAN-ECONOMIST IN THE NEW GENERATION, AND A DELEGATION OF YUGOSLAV PARLIAMENTARIANS. A STOP BY THE PRESIDENT OR VICE PRESIDENT DURING A EUROPEAN TRIP WOULD BE THE NEXT LOGICAL STEP AND SHOULD BE ACCOMPLISHED DURING THE NEXT TWELVE MONTHS. WE WOULD THEN ENVISION A 1978 TRIP BY DOLANC TO THE UNITED STATES. FOR THIS STILL LARGELY TRADITIONAL SOCIETY, PERSONAL CONNECTIONS ARE OF VITAL IMPORTANCE AND WILL BE OF VALUE IN EASING THE ENORMOUS SUSPICION YUGOSLAV LEADERS HARBOR ABOUT

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U.S. INTENTIONS TOWARD YUGOSLAVIA IN GENERAL, AND THEIR
UNCERTAINTY ABOUT THE CARTER ADMINISTRATION IN
PARTICULAR. AND GIVEN THE HIERARCHICAL QUALITY OF THIS ONE-PARTY
COMMUNIST SYSTEM, ONLY HIGH-LEVEL FIGURES CAN MAKE THE KIND
OF POLICY DECISIONS TO MODERATE YUGOSLAV STANDS WHICH WE
WANT.

5. -- ESTABLISHING A MEANINGFUL RELATIONSHIP WITH YUGOSLAVIA'S
MILITARY. ALONG WITH THE PARTY, THE MILITARY PROVIDES
THE MOST IMPORTANT CEMENT TO HOLD THIS COUNTRY TOGETHER
POST-TITO. HERE AGAIN WE SHOULD DEVELOP A DIALOGUE WITH
ITS LEADERS. AND TO STRENGTHEN YUGOSLAVIA'S WILL AND
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CAPACITY TO RESIST SOVIET PRESSURES NOTHING IS MORE
IMPORTANT THAN HELPING THEM REDUCE THEIR DEPENDENCE ON
SOVIET ARMS SUPPLIES. NOT SINCE THE LATE 1950'S HAVE WE
HAD A MEANINGFUL RELATIONSHIP IN THIS FIELD. WHILE THE
U.S. NAVY'S PORT CALLS AND OCCASIONAL VISITS BY SENIOR U.S.
MILITARY FIGURES HAVE SUSTAINED A USEFUL BUT LOW LEVEL OF
ACTIVITY, THE GOY NOW SERIOUSLY DOUBTS OUR RECENT EXPRESSIONS
OF INTEREST IN DEVELOPING A NEW ERA OF MILITARY-TO-
MILITARY COOPERATION. AFTER THE POLITICAL DECISION
WAS MADE AT THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG IN 1975 TO MOVE
AHEAD WITH SALES AND WAS COMMUNICATED TO THE YUGOSLAVS,
WE HAVE TURNED DOWN EVERY SINGLE REQUEST FOR ANYTHING OF
REAL INTEREST (EXCEPT TOW WHERE IN THGR EYES WE WERE
PLAYING ANTI-SOVIET GAMES). IN FACT WITH THE END OF TRAINING
IN THE U.S. DUE TO COST FACTORS, WE MAY ON BALANCE BE LOSING
WHAT LITTLE GROUND EXISTED IN THE MILITARY-TO-MILITARY FIELD.
A POLICY-LEVEL REVIEW WITHIN THE USG IS REQUIRED, AS MUCH
TO CLARIFY OUR OWN INTENTIONS TO OURSELVES AS ANYTHING

ELSE. SOME INITIATIVES SUCH A REVIEW MIGHT CONSIDER
INCLUDE: A PROCEDURE WHEREBY WE WOULD GUARANTEE THE GOY
A RESPONSE WITHIN A SPECIFIC TIME TO A REQUEST FOR
INFORMATION ABOUT OUR WILLINGNESS TO SELL A SPECIFIC
ITEM; DEVELOPING A LIST OF SOPHISTICATED ITEMS OF POSSIBLE
INTEREST TO THE YUGOSLAVS WHICH WE WOULD BE WILLING TO SELL
THE GOY AND COMMUNICATING THIS TO THEM; ASSIGNING AN
OFFICER FULL-TIME IN OSD/ISA TO DEVELOP MILITARY COOPERATION;
TO BALANCE THE GROWING SOVIET NAVAL PRESENCE
ON YUGOSLAVIA'S COAST, RESPOND POSITIVELY TO THEIR REQUEST
THAT WE BRING IN A FEW (OLDER AND NON-SENSITIVE) U.S.
NAVY SHIPS FOR REPAIR; USE HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO GENERATE
SOME CONCRETE PROGRESS IN SALES. ADMIRAL HOLLOWAY IS
SCHEDULED TO VISIT THIS MAY AND WE HAVE INVITED GENERAL
POTOCAR TO THE U.S. THE YUGOSLAVS HAVE NOW INDICATED
THEY WOULD LIKE AIR FORCE CHIEF OF STAFF CEMALOVIC TO
VISIT AND ARE AWAITING A SPECIFIC USG PROPOSAL OF DATES--
WHICH WE SHOULD PROVIDE ASAP. BEYOND THAT WE WOULD HOPE
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DEFENSE SECRETARY BROWN MIGHT CONSIDER VISITING YUGOSLAVIA
AND THAT HE WOULD INVITE DEF. SEC. LJUBICIC TO THE U.S.
(LJUBICIC IS NOT ONLY THE MOST INFLUENTIAL MILITARY
FIGURE BUT ONE OF TITO'S CLOSEST CONFIDANTS AND IS RUMORED TO
BE MOVING ON TO A SENIOR POLITICAL POSITION NEXT YEAR).

6. -- CREATING A PERSISTENT, PRECISE, RESULTS-ORIENTED
PROGRAM TO REDUCE YUGOSLAV DAMAGE TO OUR INTERESTS ON
KEY MULTILATERAL ISSUES. THE PROBLEM WITH OUR PAST
APPROACH TO YUGOSLAVIA IN THE MULTILATERAL ARENA IS THAT
WE HAVE BEEN ERRATIC, SWINGING FROM EXPECTING TOO MUCH,
TO ASKING NOTHING AT ALL. OUR DEMANDS ARE FREQUENTLY SO
TOTAL OR SO LATE THAT IT IS IMPOSSIBLE FOR THE GOY TO
ACCOMMODATE US EVEN IF THEY WANTED TO. AT THE OTHER
EXTREME, WE HAVE NOT RAISED OUR EXPECTATIONS OF THEM
IN RECENT BILATERAL MEETINGS AT SENIOR LEVELS EVEN THOUGH
MULTILATERAL ISSUES HAVE HISTORICALLY (WITH EMIGRES) DONE
THE MOST DAMAGE TO OUR RELATIONS. AND WE HAVE NO
CONSISTENT APPROACH TO LINKING BILATERAL PROGRAMS TO MULTI-
LATERAL GOALS. WE FORESWEAR LINKAGE IN "GOOD TIMES" BUT
IN CRISIS BRING OUR WHOLE RELATIONSHIP INTO QUESTION --
SOMETIMES WITH VERY REAL DAMAGE WHEN WE CURTAIL THOSE
PROGRAMS WHICH SHOULD BE EXEMPT FROM USE AS LEVERAGE, AT OTHER
TIMES WITH SEVERE DAMAGE TO OUR CREDIBILITY WHEN WE ISSUE
ULTIMATA AND FAIL TO FOLLOW THROUGH. THE RESULT IS MUTUAL
FRUSTRATION AND NO GAIN FOR U.S. INTERESTS, EITHER BILATERAL
OR MULTILATERAL. TO ESCAPE FROM THIS SYNDROME, WE SUGGEST
DEFINING ONE OR TWO VERY PRECISE ACTIONS OF SUBSTANTIAL
VALUE TO THE U.S. WHERE IT IS REALISTIC TO ASK FOR A
YUGOSLAV SHIFT GIVEN THEIR IDEOLOGICAL, GEO-POLITICAL AND

OTHER CONSTRAINTS. THEN WE SHOULD RAISE THESE ONE OR TWO REQUESTS AT EVERY OCCASION, INITIATING A GENUINE DIALOGUE WHICH ACKNOWLEDGES YUGOSLAVIA'S VERY REAL INFLUENCE (AND POTENTIAL DAMAGE TO US) WHILE AT THE SAME TIME WEARING THEM DOWN WITH OUR CONSISTENCE AND PERSISTENCE, AS THE SOVIETS ARE SO FOND AND SUCCESSFUL AT DOING. AND SHOULD
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THE YUGOSLAVS FAIL TO BE FORTHCOMING ON THESE ONE OR TWO VERY "DOABLE" REQUESTS, WE SHOULD CONSIDER WHAT ASPECTS OF OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP TO CUT BACK.

SPECIFICALLY, TO TAKE TWO POSSIBLE AREAS FOR SUCH AN INITIATIVE.

PUERTO RICO - WE SHOULD FORCEFULLY SEEK GOY SUPPORT FOR A MOTION TO ADJOURN C-24 CONSIDERATION OF PUERTO RICO UNTIL AN INDEFINITE FUTURE DATE, RATHER THAN MERE ABSTENTION OR PROFESSED WILLINGNESS TO ABSTAIN WHICH HAS BEEN YUGOSLAVIA'S POSITION ON POSTPONEMENT MOTIONS IN THE PAST. USUN NOTED THAT THE YUGOSLAV POSITION ON THIS TACTICAL ISSUE WAS "CRUCIAL" IN 1976 OUTCOME. WITH LIKELY CUBAN EFFORT TO FOCUS NON-ALIGNED ATTENTION ON U.S. "EXPLOITATION" OF LATIN AMERICA AS HAVANA 1979 SUMMIT APPROACHES, YUGOSLAV STANCE ON PUERTO RICO COULD BE OF STILL BROADER SIGNIFICANCE.

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MIDDLE EAST- AT A TIME THE DEPARTMENT DETERMINES TO BE MOST OPPORTUNE, WE SHOULD ASK THE GOY TO UNDERTAKE A SPECIAL AND FORCEFUL EFFORT TO CONVINCE THOSE PLO LEADERS WITH WHOM IT ENJOYS ESPECIALLY CLOSE RELATIONS OF THE NECESSITY OF A PLO PUBLIC STATEMENT AND CHANGE IN ITS COVENANT TO FORMALLY RECOGNIZE ISRAEL'S RIGHT TO EXIST. THIS IS A INITIATIVE CONSISTENT WITH THE OFT REPEATED GOY POSITION THAT A JUST SOLUTION WILL REQUIRE RECOGNITION BY ALL STATES IN THE REGION OF ONE ANOTHER'S RIGHT TO EXIST. IT IS BASED ON OUR GENERAL BELIEF THAT THE GOY
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CAN OCCASIONALLY BE INDUCED TO ACT IN A MORE CONSTRUCTIVE MANNER THAN IT OTHERWISE WOULD BY OUR FORMALLY RECOGNIZING THEIR INFLUENCE AND OUR FORMALLY SOLICITING THEIR COOPERATION IN AN ENDEAVOR TO WHICH WE EACH ATTACH CONSIDERABLE IMPORTANCE, E.G., THE ATTAINMENT OF A LASTING ME PEACE. AND JUST AS OUR BEST "CARROT" MAY BE A PIECE OF THE ACTION, SO OUR BEST "STICK" WOULD BE AN INDICATION THAT PERSISTENTLY HOSTILE BEHAVIOR BY THE GOY WILL FORCE US TO DEAL WITH OTHER NON-ALIGNED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES AS OUR MAJOR INTERLOCUTORS IN THE THIRD WORLD.

7. --FURTHERING AMERICAN TRADE AND INVESTMENT ON TERMS WHICH MEET BOTH NATIONS' INTERESTS. THE WESTERN ECONOMIC PRESINCE IN AND LINK WITH YUGOSLAVIA IS OF FUNDAMENTAL IMPORTANCE IN KEEPING THIS COUNTRY OUT OF THE SOVIET BLOC. IT IS VERY MUCH IN OUR INTEREST TO CONTINUE A VIGOROUS EXPORT PROMOTION PROGRAM, TO BROADEN MUTUAL TRADE TIES.

AT THE SAME TIME WE SHOULD CONTINUE TO STRESS THAT THE KIND OF TRADE AND INVESTMENT CLIMATE CREATED BY THE GOY ITSELF WILL BE CENTRAL TO ACHIEVING THE EXPANDED ECONOMIC COOPERATION BOT COUNTRIES SEEK. EX-IM CREDITS, MFN, GSP, AND JOINT VENTURES CAN BE EFFECTIVE ECONOMIC TOOLS

ONLY TO THE EXTENT THAT THE GOY WISHES THEM TO BE. WE SHOULD AVOID GIVING THE IMPRESSION, IN DISCUSSING SYSTEMS CHANGES IN YUGOSLAVIA, THAT THESE TOOLS ARE OF GREATER INTEREST TO THE UNITED STATES THAN TO YUGOSLAVIA. INSTEAD WE SHOULD STRESS THAT PROPERLY USED THEY OFFER A BALANCE OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

TRADE. OUR TRADE EXCHANGE MOVED INTO NEAR BALANCE IN 1976. HOWEVER, WE SHOULD NOT LOSE SIGHT OF THE FACT THAT THIS IS A DETERIORATION IN OUR TRADE POSITION WITH YUGOSLAVIA AND THAT IT WAS PARTLY CAUSED BY THE STRICT IMPORT REGIMES ADOPTED BY THE GOY IN 1975. WE SHOULD REMIND THE GOY THAT THEIR IMPORT RESTRICTIONS, WHILE JUSTIFIABLE BY BALANCE OF PAYMENTS CONSIDERATIONS IN 1975,

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WERE INTENDED AS TEMPORARY. THEIR CONTINUATION BEYOND THE TEMPORARY MAY NOT BE CONSONANT WITH THE GATT.

TECHNOLOGY. IF ONE OF OUR POLICY OBJECTIVES IS TO CONTINUE TO STRENGTHEN THE YUGOSLAV ECONOMY BY HELPING IT TO GROW, EXPAND AND DEVELOP INTO AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO A CENTRALLY-PLANNED STATE, WE MUST BECOME A MORE RELIABLE SUPPLIER OF THE TECHNOLOGY NEEDED TO TRANSFORM YUGOSLAV INDUSTRY. OUR STOP-GO POLICY ON THE KRSKO POWER PLANT HAS ADDED A NEW MEANING TO THE TERM "NUCLEAR DISASTER." ON THE MORE MUNDANE LEVEL OF EXPORT ADMINISTRATION THE POTENTIAL FOR A BETTER RELATIONSHIP EXISTS IN THE JANUARY 1977 MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT. THE INVESTIGATIONS PROMISED UNDER THIS AGREEMENT ARE NOT YET COMPLETED BY THE YUGOSLAV GOVERNMENT. WHEN THEY ARE, WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD MOVE QUICKLY TO RESOLVE REMAINING CASES. THE AGREEMENT MUST BE ADMINISTERED CONSISTENTLY AND EXPEDITIOUSLY. QUICK DENIALS OF LICENSES WHERE WE HAVE REASON TO BELIEVE THAT A DIVERSION MAY BE INTENDED ARE AS IMPORTANT AS QUICK APPROVALS WHEN NO SUCH EVIDENCE EXISTS. U.S. DEALYS AND DECISIONS SEEN HERE AS ARBITRARY OR CAPRICIOUS CAUSE A GREAT DEAL OF UNNECESSARY APPREHENSION IN THIS JUMPY SOCIETY.

INVESTMENT. THE BASIC LAW ON FOREIGN JOINT VENTURES IS EXPECTED TO BE REVISED AND ISSUED IN NEW FORM SOME TIME IN 1977. WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE GOY TO GIVE MAXIMUM PUBLICITY TO THIS LAW WHEN IT APPEARS AND ALSO BE MORE FORTHCOMING IN RELEASING NON-CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ON JOINT VENTURES WHICH ALREADY EXIST. (ALTHOUGH THIS INFORMATION IS SUPPOSEDLY A MATTER OF PUBLIC RECORD, THE LAST FULL LIST OF JOINT VENTURES PUBLISHED BY THE GOY

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DATES BACK TO 1974.) WE SHOULD ALSO CONTINUE TO INFORMALLY
COUNSEL THE YUGOSLAVS PRIOR TO THE PASSAGE OF THE NEW LAW
ON ITS LIKELY IMPACT ON POTENTIAL INVESTORS, STRESSING
THE IMPORTANCE POTENTIAL INVESTORS WILL ATTACH TO THE LAW'S
TONE AND WHETHER OR NOT IT IS FORTHCOMING TOWARDS FOREIGN
INVESTMENT.

8. -- BUILDING CONFIDENCE IN OUR INTENTIONS. A
CENTRAL REASON THE GOY CONSIDERS NOT JUST THE SOVIET UNION
BUT THE UNITED STATES A MAJOR THREAT IS THEIR BELIEF THAT
WE CONDONE AND EVEN TO SOME EXTENT SUPPORT CROATIAN
SEPARATISM. NOTHING IS MORE POISONOUS TO YUGOSLAV CON-
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FIDENCE IN OUR INTENTIONS, NOR MORE LIKELY TO DRIVE THEM
INTO THE SOVIETS' ARMS. WE RECOGNIZE THAT CROATIAN-
AMERICANS HAVE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS WHICH CANNOT AND
SHOULD NOT BE WAIVED OR DIMINISHED. BUT WITHIN THOSE CONSTRAINTS
OUR RECORD TOWARDS SEPARATISM IS NOT WITHOUT BLEMISH. WE

HAVE NOT DEVOTED THE RESOURCES, OR BEEN WILLING TO PAY THE DOMESTIC POLITICAL PRICE REQUIRED TO CLEARLY DISASSOCIATE OURSELVES FROM CROATIAN SEPARATISTS AND THEIR ACTS OF TERRORISM, INCLUDING SEEMINGLY ANNUAL BOMBINGS IN THE U.S. FOR SEVERAL DECADES WITH NO CONVICTIONS. THE CONTINUATION OF ACTS OF VIOLENCE BY SEPARATISTS AND OUR FAILURE TO CATCH THE TERRORISTS CONFIRM YUGOSLAV SUSPICIONS THAT THE FBI AND CIA ARE SUPPORTING THE EMIGRES, WHO SEEK TO DIVIDE THIS COUNTRY AND UNDERMINE ITS SOCIAL SYSTEM. IF THE TWA HIJACKERS ARE CONVICTED, WE WILL HAVE A RARE OPPORTUNITY TO TURN OVER A NEW LEAF IN THIS KEY AREA. FIRST, THE HIGHEST LEVELS OF THE USG SHOULD USE AN EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO SPEAK OUT PUBLICLY AGAINST THE SEPARATIST GOALS AS WELL AS THE MEANS OF SUCH TERRORISTS (OBVIOUSLY ONLY AFTER THE TRIAL). WE SHOULD INTENSIFY OUR EFFORTS TO INFORM OURSELVES ABOUT TERRORIST-SUPPORTING EMIGRE GROUPS, AND TO PREVENT OR PUNISH TERRORIST ACTS. FOR THE SAME REASONS THE USG SHOULD DEPORT WAR CRIMINALS LIKE ANDREJ ARTUKOVIC. AND WE SHOULD CONSIDER AGREEING TO THE YUGOSLAV PROPOSAL FOR DIRECT LIAISON BETWEEN THE JUSTICE DEPT, THE FBI AND THE YUGOSLAV SECRETARIAT FOR INTERNAL AFFAIRS, LIAISON WHICH SEVERAL WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ALREADY HAVE. IN RETURN WE SHOULD ASK FOR CONSULAR PROTECTION FOR OUR DUAL NATIONALS HERE--ANOTHER ONE OF THE MAJOR PROBLEMS IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONSHIP FOR SEVERAL DECADES. IDEALLY WE SHOULD OBTAIN A NEW CONSULAR CONVENTION GUARANTEEING ACCESS AND FAIR TREATMENT, OR FAILING THAT AT LEAST AGREEMENT THAT IN ALL BUT THE MOST EXTRAORDINARY CASES WE WOULD BE GRANTED ACCESS. WHILE NOT SANGUINE ABOUT OUR PROSPECTS, WE BELIEVE THE NEW AMBASSADOR MIGHT WELL RAISE THIS WITH THE GOY, USING THE ARGUMENT

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THAT HE WISHED TO AVOID A REPETITION OF THE PAST AND THAT IT WOULD BE WELL RECEIVED IN THIS YEAR OF CSCE IN BELGRADE.

9.-- OBTAINING YUGOSLAV COOPERATION IN DISARMAMENT AND NON-PROLIFERATION, WHILE MOVING AHEAD ON KRSKO; THE IMPASSE OVER ISSUANCE OF AN EXPORT LICENSE FOR THE KRSKO NUCLEAR PLANT IS THE MOST URGENT PROBLEM IN OUR BILATERAL RELATIONS, AND IT IS ONE OF THE FIRST TEST CASES FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S NEW POLICY ON NUCLEAR EXPORTS AND NON-PROLIFERATION. WE HAVE A MAJOR INCENTIVE IN DEALING COOPERATIVELY WITH THE YUGOSLAVS AS THEY ARE THE MAIN MOVERS ON DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS IN THE THIRD WORLD, INTER ALIA AS THE GOD-FATHER OF THE UN SPECIAL SESSION ON DISARMAMENT. ONGOING NEGOTIATIONS ARE CLARIFYING BOTH SIDES POSITIONS ON KRSKO. WE MUST PERSIST IN OUR PRESENT APPROACH. BUT IF WE REACH AN IMPASSE, SEVERAL ALTERNATIVES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. ONE WAY OUT MIGHT BE FOR THE U.S. TO OFFER TO BUY THE SPENT

FUEL FROM KRSKO, POSSIBLY REPLACING THE RECOVERABLE PLUTONIUM AND UNFISSIONED U235 WITH AN EQUIVALENT (ENERGY) AMOUNT OF SLIGHTLY ENRICHED URANIUM FUEL. AND IF WE ARE UNABLE TO GET EVERYTHING WE WANT IN A UNILATERAL GOY STATENEMTN. WE COULD PROPOSE A TRADE-OFF TO THE GOY--IF THE YUGOSLAVS WOULD COMMIT THEMSELVES TO WORK FOR PRESIDENT CARTER'S PROPOSAL FOR A NEW MULTILATERAL AGREEMENT TO STRENGTHEN SAFEGUARDS INCLUDING WHATEVER SPECIFIC SAFEGUARDS THEY HAD NOT ACCEPTED UNILATERALLY, WE WOULD AGREE TO MOVE FORWARD WITH LICENSING THE NUCLEAR VESSEL FOR KRSKO. THIS WOULD STILL LEAVE THE FUEL LICENSE AS LEVERAGE TO INSURE THEIR FOLLOW-THROUGH IN PUSHING FOR NEW SAFEGUARDS IN THE IAEA AND IN THE SSOD, AND THE ISSUANCE OF THE UNILATERAL STATEMENT THEY HAVE ALREADY PROVIDED WOULD BE AT LEAST ONE VISIBLE SUCCESS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION'S NON-PROLIFERATION POLICY IN THE MIDST OF SOME REVERSES. ANOTHER "CARROT" AND CONTINUING POINT OF LEVERAGE WOULD BE FOR US TO TAKE THE YUGOSLAVS UP ON THEIR PERSISTENTLY EXPRESSED DESIRE FOR SPECIAL BILATERAL CONSULTATIONS ON THE WHOLE RANGE OF DISARMAMENT QUESTIONS, SECRET

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PARTICULARLY IN CONNECTION WITH THE SPECIAL SESSION.

10.-- SAVING OUR RELATIONS WITH THE SCIENTIFIC COMMUNITY FROM SEVERE DAMAGE. AFTER A DECADE OF HIGH ACTIVITY, U.S.-YUGOSLAV COOPERATION IN SCIENCE WILL FALL OFF SHARPLY NEXT YEAR WHEN THE EXCESS CURRENCY PROGRAM WINDS DOWN. IN A PERIOD WHEN WE SHOULD BE INCREASING OUR CONTACT WITH ALL ELEMENTS OF YUGOSLAV SOCIETY, THIS IS UNFORTUNATE. U.S.DOLLAR GRANTS TO A FEW CENTERS OF EXCELLENCE WILL MAINTAIN SOME MOMENTUM. HOWEVER, YUGOSLAV SCIENTIFIC INSTITUTES ARE GENERALLY UNABLE TO MATCH THE COMPETITION IN THE U.S. AND ELSEWHERE FOR THE ALWAYS SCARCE RESEARCH DOLLAR. SCIENCE HERE TENDS TO BE FRAGMENTED, DIRECTIONLESS AND UNDERSUPPORTED. OFFICIALDOM IS DISILLUSIONED WITH THE LACK OF PRACTICAL RESULTS. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IS BURDENED BY THE DRAG OF AN UNCOMPREHENDING, SLUGGISH, IDEOLOGICALLY SUSPICIOUS BUREAUCRACY (FAISECTD), GIVEN THESE PROSPECTS, THE USG SHOULD CONTINUE ITS EFFORTS TO CONVINCE THE YUGOSLAVS THAT THE DECREASE IN SCIENTIFIC COOPERATION REFLECTS THE END OF A SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCE AND NOT A POLITICALLY-MOTIVATED DECISION TO RESTRICT YUGOSLAV ACCESS TO U.S. SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY. WE DO NOT ADVOCATE SPECIAL TREATMENT FOR THE YUGOSLAVS WHERE AMERICAN SCIENCE DOES NOT STAND TO GAIN IN PROPORTION TO ANY U.S. INVESTMENT. BUT TO SALVAGE WHAT WE BELIEVE IS IN BOTH OUR SCIENTIFIC AND POLITICAL INTEREST TO SAVE, THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD: (1) SUPPORT THE NAS PRESIDENT HANDLER IN HIS EFFORT TO PERSUADE THE NSF TO CONCUR WITH THE INTER-ACADEMY AGREEMENT FOR JOINT RESEARCH EXCHANGE; (2) URGE

ERDA TO MAINTAIN MOMENTUM ON THE SOLAR NEUTRINO PROJECT
WITH FE-NI OF MACEDONIA; AND (3) SEEK TO ASSURE THAT THE
REMAINING EXCESS CURRENCY FINDS IN THE JOINT INTEREST
ACCOUNT SHOULD BE USED TO INVOLVE ADDITIONAL USG TECHNICAL
AGENCIES IN FUTURE COOPERATION.

-- COMMUNICATING AMERICA'S POLICIES AND IDEALS, WE
PROPOSE AN INTENSIFIED, MORE PRECISELY TARGETTED EFFORT
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TO BREAK THROUGH THE IDEOLOGICAL HOSTILITY OF THIS
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ACTION EUR-12

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SS-15 SP-02 PER-01 SIG-01 A-01
MMO-01 EB-08 SCA-01 IO-13 INR-07 PM-04 CU-02
AGRE-00 AID-05 CIAE-00 COME-00 DODE-00 FEAE-00
NSC-05 TRSE-00 USIA-06 /085 W
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R 241030Z MAR 77
FM AMEMBASSY BELGRADE
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2
INFO AMEMBASSY ATHENS
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AMEMBASSY BUCHAREST
AMEMBASSY BUDAPEST
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY PRAGUE
AMEMBASSY ROME
AMEMBASSY SOFIA
USMISSION NATO
AMEMBASSY VIENNA
AMEMBASSY WARSAW
AMCONSUL ZAGREB

S E C R E T SECTION 5 OF 5 BELGRADE 1776

REGIME WITH OUR MESSAGE, TO LAUNCH A GREATER DIALOGUE
ABOUT OUR TWO SYSTEMS. SPECIFICALLY: WASHINGTON
AND BELGRADE SHOULD PUSH THE YUGOSLAVS TO ALLOW RISING
LEADERS FROM THE LEAGUE OF COMMUNISTS, SOCIALIST ALLIANCE
AND SOCIALIST YOUTH ORGANIZATION TO ACCEPT OUR INVITATIONS
TO VISIT THE U.S. UNDER THE INTERNATIONAL VISITORS PROGRAM.
WE SHOULD HOLD THE LINE ON AN EQUAL BALANCE BETWEEN SOCIAL
SCIENCES-HUMANITIES AND PURE-APPLIED SCIENCES IN THE FULBRIGHT
PROGRAM. WE BELIEVE WE CAN ANSWER YUGOSLAV DEMANDS
FOR A GREATER VOICE IN THE FULBRIGHT COMMISSION'S DECISIONS
WITH A DRIVE FOR GREATER FINANCIAL CONTRIBUTIONS FROM
THEM, THUS FREEING U.S. FUNDS FOR SIGNIFICANTLY GREATER

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IVP ACTIVITY. WE SHOULD PERSISTENTLY PROTEST EXISTING OBSTACLES TO CONTACT WITH ACADEMIC AND OTHER INSTITUTIONS AND GROUPS AND SEEK MEANS AROUND THESE OBSTACLES, E.G., BROADENING OUR APPROACH TO CULTURAL AND EDUCATIONAL EXCHANGES IN THIS COUNTRY TO INCLUDE RESEARCH INSTITUTIONS, PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS, AS WELL AS ORGANIZATIONS AND INDIVIDUALS IN THE FIELDS OF THE VISUAL AND PERFORMING ARTS. WE SHOULD CONTINUE OUR ACTIVIST APPROACH TO MEDIA MISTREATMENT OF THE U.S. AND RECOMMEND THAT WASHINGTON FOLLOW SUIT WITH THE YUGOSLAV EMBASSY IN WASHINGTON, PARTICULARLY WHEN IT COMPALINS ABOUT THE RELATIVELY MORE OBJECTIVE U.S. MEDIA'S REPORTING ON YUGOSLAVIA. IN THIS RE-IGNITING A NEW DORMANT EFFORT TO RECRUIT A YUGOSLAV NEWSMAN TO WORK FOR A YEAR WITH THE SERBO-CROATIAN SERVICE OF THE VOA, AND A PROGRAM OF VISITS TO THE SIXTH FLEET TO GIVE A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF OUR MEDITERRANEAN NAVAL POLICY BEGINNING WITH YUGOSLAV NEWSMEN AND EXPANDING TO CIVILIAN GOVT OFFICIALS, ACADEMICS AND MILITARY LEADERS. FINALLY WE NEED TO TEST THE GOY'S WILLINGNESS TO ALLOW THE OUTLYING U.S. INFORMATION CENTERS TO PLAY A ROLE COMMENSURATE WITH THEIR COST, TO MODERATE THE ARTIFICIAL BUT EFFECTIVE LIMITATIONS PLACED BY THE YUGOSLAV PARTY, POLICE AND BUREAUCRACY ON THESE AMERICAN DIPLOMATS.

11. -- DEFINING A RHETORICAL POLICY. FINALLY IN UNDER-TAKING A NEW POLITICAL AND MILITARY DIALOGUE WE NEED A CLEAR RHETORICAL POLICY. WHAT WE SAY IS ONE OF OUR MAIN INSTRUMENTS OF INFLUENCE--IN MANY CASES OUR BEST, EVEN OUR ONLY MEANS OF INFLUENCE. THE TEMPTATION IS STRONG TO MOUTH PAP ABOUT GOOD RELATIONS AND SUPPORT FOR "NON-ALIGNMENT", A MOVEMENT AS PRACTICED BY YUGOSLAVIA ESSENTIALLY HARMFUL TO U.S. INTERESTS. INSTEAD WE NEED TO ENGAGE THE YUGOSLAVS IDEOLOGICALLY, BOTH IN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS. THEIR MARXIST IDEOLOGY IS RESPONSIBLE FOR A FUNDAMENTALLY DIFFERENT WORLD VIEW AND ONE WHICH PORTRAYS

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THE UNITED STATES AS THE CAUSE OF MANY OF THE WORLD'S PROBLEMS. WE SHOULD NOT HESITATE TO CHALLENGE THE INFERENCES DRAWN FROM THAT IDEOLOGY. WE SHOULD STRIKE THESE THEMES:

--WE SUPPORT YUGOSLAVIA'S INDEPENDENCE, UNITY AND TERRITORIAL INTEGRITY (BUT NOT ITS "NON-ALIGNED" POLICY WHICH IS TO THE LEFT OF THE NON-ALIGNED CENTER -- AND WHENEVER WE REFER TO OUR ACCEPTANCE OF THE PRINCIPLE OF

NON-ALIGNMENT, IT SHOULD BE WITH THE ADJECTIVES
"GENUINE" OR "REAL" IN FRONT).

--WE DO NOT CARE WHAT DEGREE OF GOVERNMENT INVOLVE-
MENT THERE IS IN THE MANAGEMENT OF ANY OTHER NATION'S
ECONOMY. SOCIALISM VS. CAPITALISM IS NOT THE ISSUE --
DICTATORSHIP VS. DEMOCRACY IS. WE ADMIRE THE HUMANISTIC
AND DEMOCRATIC IDEALS OF THE THEORY OF SELF-MANAGEMENT--
WE WILL WATCH WITH KEEN INTEREST IN THE YEARS AHED WHETHER
IN PRACTICE IT MOVES FURTHER TOWARDS OR AWAY FROM
INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS.

--WE SEEK NO SPECIAL RIGHTS IN YUGOSLAVIA -- BASES,
OVERFLIGHT OR CONTROL OVER DOMESTIC POLITICAL DECISIONS.
THE PEOPLE OF YUGOSLAVIA SHOULD BE LEFT ALONE TO DECIDE
WHATEVER FORM OF GOVERNMENT THEY WANT. WE CHALLENGE
THE SOVIET UNION TO MAKE THE SAME SORT OF PUBLIC COMMIT-
MENT.

12. PARTS II AND III FOLLOW SEPTTEL.
YORK

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Message Attributes

Automatic Decaptioning: X
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Disposition Approved on Date:
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Disposition Date: 22 May 2009
Disposition Event:
Disposition History: n/a
Disposition Reason:
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Document Source: CORE
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Drafter: n/a
Enclosure: n/a
Executive Order: GS
Errors: N/A
Expiration:
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Original Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Original Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
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Previous Channel Indicators: n/a
Previous Classification: SECRET
Previous Handling Restrictions: n/a
Reference: n/a
Retention: 0
Review Action: RELEASED, APPROVED
Review Content Flags:
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Review Media Identifier:
Review Release Date: n/a
Review Release Event: n/a
Review Transfer Date:
Review Withdrawn Fields: n/a
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Secure: OPEN
Status: NATIVE
Subject: PARM - ANNUAL POLICY AND RESOURCE ASSESSMENT FOR YUGOSLAVIA- PART I
TAGS: PFOR, YO, US, UR
To: STATE
Type: TE
vdkgvwkey: odbc://SAS/SAS.dbo.SAS_Docs/794e20b3-c288-dd11-92da-001cc4696bcc
Review Markings:
Margaret P. Grafeld
Declassified/Released
US Department of State
EO Systematic Review
22 May 2009
Markings: Margaret P. Grafeld Declassified/Released US Department of State EO Systematic Review 22 May 2009